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Introduction
There has since the early 1980s been an increasing focus on ‘the body’ and embodiment within social theory; a focus that sought to recover from philosophy and classical sociology a subject that had become marginalized within academic thought. Concerned to explicate the collective and individual significance of our incarnate existence, early contributions to this theoretical turn explored how societies managed populations through the structural objectification of the body as Körper (the fleshy physical shell) (Turner 1984). Complementing this approach, other analyses moved away from conceptions of the socially determined body by emphasising the experiencing, acting and interacting Lieb (the lived body), and by exploring the relationship between these action-oriented/phenomenal and structural dimensions of embodiment (Freund 1982; O’Neill 1985; Frankenberg 1990; Ots 1990). 
These contrasting approaches advocated distinctive routes to recovering the body, but each engaged in a sustained interrogation of the core and residual categories associated with people’s physical being within existing theoretical traditions. From these critiques, moreover, emerged novel analytical frameworks that identified embodiment as foundational to the development of ‘the social’ as an emergent sphere of human existence (e.g. Frank 1991; Shilling 1993; Turner 2006).  Moving beyond exploring the body as Körper or Lieb, such writings sought to reconstruct social theory by revisiting and developing past resources.
This identification of embodiment as foundational for social theory developed at a time when grand narratives had become anathema for sociological and cultural thought. Yet its proponents were not advocating an ‘enfleshed’ return to the Archimedean conceit that it was possible to construct a ‘perspectiveless perspective’ on the world, but newly grounded approaches towards longstanding theoretical problems. These included analysing the history of social relationships through an appreciation of the environmentally emplaced evolution of human attributes (Hirst and Wooley 1981), inquiring into epistemology by starting from the cultural mediation of the human senses (Stoller 1989), and reconstructing social ontology by identifying the corporeal foundations of gendered identities (Grosz 1994). 
The significance of these concerns was paralleled within mainstream social theory. The body became opened for investigation within theories of status inequalities (Bourdieu, 1979), the political origins and development of ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1988), pragmatist reconceptualisations of creative action (Joas, 1996), and the generation of emergent phenomena in realist accounts of society (Archer, 2000). Elsewhere, the absorption of human physicality within the expert systems of science, medicine and technology was seen as an exemplar of nature’s abolition within the self-referential parameters of late modern globalisation (Giddens, 1991), while the body was also recognised as a battleground for regimes competing to impose religious and secular prescriptions upon this-worldly experiences and actions through the promotion of particular forms of habitus (Mellor and Shilling, 1997; Mahmood, 2005).
Taken together, these theoretical developments exerted a remarkable effect across the social sciences and humanities, displacing the sense that the bodily foundations of human being were biologically determined and irrelevant to the working of societies and cultures. It is no exaggeration, indeed, to suggest that the ‘rise of the body’ - along with associated concerns with the senses and affect - has been one of the most significant developments to occur in sociology and related fields during the last thirty years. During this time a distinctive theoretical terrain has been carved out that includes histories of the body (e.g. Feher, et al., 1989; Sawday 1995); urban studies of the body (e.g. Sennett 1994); feminist theories of the body (e.g. Butler 1990, 1993; Diprose 1994; Grosz 1994; Connell 1987; Kirby, 1997; Frost, 2001); excavations of religious bodies (e.g. Mahmood 2005; Coakley, 2010), working bodies (e.g. Wolkowitz 2006) and sporting bodies (e.g. Thorpe 2011; Maguire et al., 2016); analyses of health, disability and embodiment (e.g. Turner 1987; 1992; Frank 1995; Williams 2003; Freund 2011); studies of embodied emotions and affect (Blackman 2012; Howes and Classen 2013); diverse readers, reviews and collections of essays on the subject (e.g. Frank 1990; Featherstone et al., 1991; Scott and Morgan 1993; Fraser and Greco 2004; Malacrida and Low 2008); a growing number of texts (e.g. Cregan 2006; Howson 2012); special editions of such journals including Sociology of Health and Illness, and Societies; and the launch in 1995 of the international refereed journal Body & Society. The fact that this sample only scratches the surface of the proliferation and reach of body studies illustrates the significance of this field. 
Exploring the background to this change, and the theoretical advances it facilitated, this chapter examines the historical context for this renewed attention to embodiment, before identifying contrasting analytical tendencies regarding what the body is and how it should be analysed that continue to make it such a contested area.  The meaning of the body metamorphoses as we move between perspectives and while this can be viewed as a productive response to Fields’s (1995: lvi) call to go beyond the body if we are to recognize its social significance, I argue that recent perspectives risk losing sight of the enfleshed actor within their depictions of society and social relationships. Against this background, I conclude by suggesting that revisiting creatively the notion of the body schema can provide us with an essential counterweight to the strong constructionist and materialist orientations of recent writings; a counterweight that allows us to pursue different theoretical options while preventing the facticity of embodied subjects to disappear from view. 

The Intellectualist Fallacy in Western Thought
The rise of the body in social theory constituted a reaction against those Western linguistic and philosophical traditions that identified consciousness as the defining characteristic of the human species. In Ancient Greece, for example, ‘soma’ referred to the corpse before signifying ‘the body’.  Analytically, Socrates’s perishable flesh / immortal soul distinction influenced subsequent oppositions drawn between the ‘irrational passions’ and ‘rational thought’. Even Aristotle’s conception of the hexus, that continues to shape notions of the habitus, accorded priority to the mind (Mellor and Shilling 2014a). Reflecting the priorities of Greek philosophy and ethics, these concepts were associated with a more general view that the proper cultivation of the soul was the responsibility of a ‘healthy thinking’ that enabled citizens to rise above the suffering body (Snell 1960 [1948]). 
Mind / body hierarchies continued to flourish in the Judeo-Christian tradition: Augustine’s Confessions conceptualized physical habits as bondage, while Aquinas held that deliberative choices for the good should overcome ‘unthinking habits’ (Davies 2011). Later, philosophers reinforced this theological devaluation of habit by embracing a dualism that distrusted physical experience. Most influentially, Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum (‘I think therefore I am’) suggested that ‘my mind …is entirely and truly distinct from my body and may exist without it’ and that ‘I am…only a thing that thinks’ (Descartes 1974 [1634]: 105, 156). Focused on explicating the grounds of ethical action, Kant (1964 [1785]) echoed such sentiments by identifying a rational foundation for universal laws elevating duty above desire and rejecting the possibility that criterion for the good emerged from humans’ natural properties.
These traditions established clear oppositions between cognitive thought and the material body, while also projecting a hierarchy of values onto people’s sensory capabilities. In Greek philosophy, the eye was the mind’s gateway to knowledge, with the ‘distant’ sense of seeing endorsed as a privileged route to aesthetic appreciation. Descartes ultimately accepted sight as a vehicle of knowledge, yet continued to distrust the other senses, while Kant (1978 [1798]) also identified sight as the noblest and most objective sense. 
This philosophical and theological background structured the development of social theory. Weber (1968) identified truly human action as based on rational calculation - with emotionally driven or habitual behavior unworthy of that status - while also attributing to ideas a major historical role (Weber, 1991 [1904-05]). Durkheim (1938) conceptualized sociology as the study of social/moral ‘facts’ existing ‘beyond’ and ‘out of reach’ of those embodied subjects affected by them. Both distanced social theory from the evolutionary basis of Herbert Spencer’s thought. Later, that great synthesizer of sociological theory Talcott Parsons (1937) reinforced these tendencies towards downgrading the body and emotions by interpreting the normative dimensions of Durkheim’s and Weber’s writings in terms of information rich values rather than energy high collective effervescences or charismatic forces, and by neglecting the pragmatists for whom embodiment and environment were central.
	As John O’Neill (1985: 18) notes, social theory eventually rejected the ‘over-socialised’ conception of the actor associated with Parsons’s commitment to ‘the study of the rules and normative behavior that proceed from people’s beliefs’ rather than bodies, but this did not initially prompt a nuanced concern with embodiment. Rational choice theory made residual the ‘bodily passions’ on which its commitment to calculated action depended, whilst ignoring human frailty and interdependence (Joas 1996). Symbolic interactionism also marginalised the body, despite claiming roots in pragmatism. Herbet Blumer (1969) exemplified this by reifying the social and material environment transactions in which humans engage in into an all-pervasive concern with symbolism, ignoring the interest of Mead and other pragmatists in ‘forging a socialized conception of nature and human biology for social theory’ (Rochberg-Halton 1987: 195).
	Theoretical accounts of specific social sectors also sequestrated the body, none more influentially during the latter decades of the twentieth century than the secularization thesis. Peter Berger (1967), then one of its foremost proponents, exemplifies the cognitive bias of secularizing narratives in suggesting that religious belief systems are undermined by science and relativized by sectarianism. Yet his emphasis on ‘propositional certainties’ (Norris and Inglehart 2004) - echoed in Bruce’s (2010: 135) insistence that religious belief is the ‘bottom line’ in secularization debates – ignores how religion becomes embodied through ritualized ‘pedagogics’ centered upon emotion, smell, touch, possession, and material culture (Mellor and Shilling 2010).
 
Excavating the Body from Social Thought 
This devaluation of corporeality was not universal. It was rejected firmly by the major Eastern traditions, with Taoist classics such as the Tao Te Ching eschewing dualisms, viewing the body as a vehicle of knowledge, and conceptualising the distinctions evident in human existence through the intertwined cosmic forces of yin and yang. Within the West there also existed a ‘secret history’ of body relevant writings (Turner 1991), including Spinoza’s monism (based on the notion of an absolute and infinite substance in which thought, feeling and doing exist within a broader unity of becoming), and Marx’s early writings (in which humans developed their physical and cognitive capacities by transforming their environment).  In addition, Nietzsche’s (1993 [1871]) contrast between Apollonian rationality and Dionysian sensuality assisted explorations of the internally fractured dimensions of human being, as well as struggles between individuals and society.
This marginalized history was not exclusively philosophical, moreover, and three seams of body relevant writings within the ‘underbelly’ of classical sociological and social theory have proven especially influential in steering body studies. These involve conceptualisations of historical change (whereby contrasting modes of embodiment provide a foundation for the emergence of social formations), embodied consciousness (in which the capacity for thought is emplaced within the intentional physical subject and wider environment), and gendered identities (wherein inequalities and prejudices shape the bodily capacities of women and men). 

The Embodied Foundations of Historical Change 
In opposing idealist conceptions of history, it was Marx who constructed a full-blown materialism based on the recognition that humans re-made themselves and their environment through the social relationships entered into, and the tools utilized, in securing the means of subsistence (Marx, 1970: 121; Marx and Engels, 1970: 47). Coupled with his conceptualization of humans as an embodied species-being whose self- and worldly-transformations were steered by physical and emotional as well as cognitive responses to oppression, Marx informed later sociological suggestions that contrasting forms of embodiment provided a foundation for successive modes of production (Mellor and Shilling, 1997).
	This association of embodiment with historical development was complemented by parallels drawn between society and the human organism within the French tradition of social thought. Comte (1853: 150) linked morally harmonious societies with actions informed by mind and heart, while Tönnies developed these themes into a theory of social transformation by understanding the shift from medieval to modern societies as the outcome of embodied wills (Levine 1995). While Gemeinschaft was sustained by expressions of instinct, habit and spontaneity that remained immersed in their social and natural surroundings (Wesenwille), Gesellschaft was dependent upon a deliberative, calculating and rational will distanced from and individualized within its surroundings (Kurwille). Relatedly, despite his methodological holism distancing theory from biology and psychology through its focus on social facts, Durkheim explored the embodied internalization of society. His last major study argued that while bodies generated egoistic appetites, the effervescence circulating in social assemblies demonstrated they were also the source of culturally productive affects and values: the body ‘conceals in its depth a sacred principle that erupts onto the surface’ via markings/adornments that affirmed membership of a moral whole (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 138, 233). 
	Emanating from the methodologically individualist German tradition, Weber and Simmel also recruited embodiment to their analyses of social change. Despite focusing on ideas, Weber (1991 [1904-05]) traced the emergence of an early modern Protestant habitus suited to the rigors of rational action, while also identifying physical and emotional eroticism as shelters from instrumentalism. For Simmel (1971 [1918]), the significance of bodily drives and human vitalism to the creation and transcendence of social and cultural forms ensured that individuals could never be subsumed entirely within society: there is always more-life (mehr-leben) than the interactions in which an individual is engaged, with people invariably reserving part of themselves from specific exchanges (Simmel 1971 [1908b]).
	Seeking to remove sociological thinking from its philosophically categorical moorings, Norbert Elias rejected conceptually ‘reifying’ divisions between ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ societies and bodies, but remained sensitive to the importance of interdependent embodied beings for historical change. His magisterial account of the civilizing process traces how the minutiae of people’s behavior and appearances were connected to societally transformational developments in the pursuit of distinction, the division of labour, and governmental monopolies of violence (Elias 2000 [1939]). Conflicts that used to occur between people developed into intrapersonal struggles, actions motivated by reflexive deliberation and mutual identification rather than impulse became a prerequisite for success, and the body emerges as a sophisticated vehicle for display. 
	These varied contributions towards embodying historical change informed and have been supplemented by recent additions to this area. These range from Maffesoli’s (1996) and Mestrovic’s (1994) opposed diagnoses of the character of (post-)modern social groups, to Mellor and Shilling’s (1997; 2014b) and Mahmood’s (2005) analyses of forms and reformations of embodiment, to Eliasian accounts of the webs of inter-corporeal interdependence that drive social developments (Wouters 2007; Gabriel and Mennell 2011). Despite variations in the precise meaning of the body, these approaches imparted a facticity to the ontology and meaning of their subject as a consequence of their concern to explore the relationship between the enfleshed subject and society.  Each of them invested embodied subjects with a weight that necessitated analyzing them as causally significant.  

Embodying thought
Social change was not the only area in which classical social theory’s ‘underbelly’ informed contemporary investigations of embodiment. While dominant philosophical traditions in the West divided mind from body, elevating thought over sensing and feeling, particular writers explored the embodiment of consciousness. From a phenomenological perspective, Merleau-Ponty (1962) viewed the body as our ‘vehicle’ of being in the word, examining how our senses interweave themselves into their surroundings when building a multi-layered picture of the environment with which we communicate. Cognition/thought/reflexivity is here a bodily activity undertaken by individuals always already environmentally emplaced. Elias (1991a) also challenged conventional philosophy in identifying the human capacity to reflect, write and read with symbols as an evolutionary ‘lift-off’ related to the physical and material grounding of our cognitive capacities. It is pragmatist theory, however, that has perhaps exerted most influence in analyses of embodied consciousness. Dewey, Mead, Peirce and James identified symbolic thought as part of embodied subjects’ interconnections with and intentional relations towards their surroundings. In so doing, they suggested that action passes through cycles of habit, crisis and creativity as individuals experience equilibrium or disturbance within their environment, (e.g. Mead 1962 [1934]: 204; Peirce, 1997 [1903]; Dewey, 2002 [1922]: 194). 
Dewey grounded thinking in our embodiment and wider environment, but attributed it with properties ‘abstracted’ from situational immediacy. These enable individuals to contemplate problems by manipulating symbols that represent the environment virtually (Dewey 2011: 11), yet these symbols continue to resonate with the contexts to which they relate. There are several reasons for this. First, linguistic symbols carry affective weight because their referents can be (imagined as) encountered; encounters that are subject to the process of inquiry central to what Peirce (1998) identifies as the sign, object and interpretant elements involved in signification. Second, thought resonates with those social relationships that inform the learning of symbols. This point is central to Mead’s (1962 [1934]) account of the reflexive mediation of the I/Me relationship, while inter-corporeal communication requires social transaction between at least two communicants capable of taking the attitude of the other toward a third thing (Garrison 2015). Finally, cognitive thinking is also linked to our bodily location within a wider environment as a consequence of the conditions through which it is stimulated.  It is the interruption of habit that provokes thought, circumstances related ultimately to adaptive connections with the environment (Dewey 1981 [1925]: 212; 2011: 11). Thus, while thought possesses symbolic properties, it occurs within embodied subjects whose abstraction from the contexts in and about which they deliberate is never total.
The mention of an adaptive connection linking cognition to environmentally located embodied subjects suggests that thought is linked to bodily experiences of equilibrium or consternation (Dewey 1980 [1934]: 35-7). While educated thought is key to conscious knowledge, indeed, the quality of thinking itself relies on the experiential bodily basis it rests upon. In this context, pragmatism emphasises that people learn not only from symbolic thought but also directly from sensory physical activity: the most basic features of embodiment enable people to acquire information about their environment that is irreducible to cognitive symbols and exists outside their bodily topography (Dewey 1980 [1934]: 13). 
This pragmatist reconceptualization of the conventional Western philosophical approach towards (embodied) consciousness exerted most influence on body relevant writings by shaping the theoretical underpinnings on which the Chicago School of sociology flourished. Pragmatism provided guidance for ethnographically enriched investigations into the symbolism, meanings and actions of a wide range of groups within the modern metropolis. It not only informed classical studies in the embodiment of culture - ranging from Anderson’s (1961 [1923]) The Hobo to Wacquant’s recent (2004) Body and Soul - but also inspired a vibrant collection of writings on the ‘body pedagogics’ of contrasting social groups (e.g. Grasseni 2007; Lande 2009; O’Connor 2007).  Once again, while there exists variation in defining the body subject within these writings, they share a commitment to the idea of causally significant enfleshed individuals able to construct contrasting ‘ways of life’ as a consequence of their emplacement within and intentional orientation towards the wider environment. 

Identity and Inequality 
A third significant seam of body relevant theory within social thought involves a long tradition of marginalized women writers sensitive to the embodied dimensions of gender identities and gender stratification (e.g. Astell 1730; Macauley 1974 [1790]; Wollstonecraft 1989 [1787-97]; see McDonald 1997: 113). Wollstonecraft (1792) criticized the presentation of women as sexualized creatures destined to gratify men, for example, while Germaine de Stael (1798) provided another important early contribution by interrogating Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy in order to explore the embodied bonds between mother and children as pre-contractual foundations for human societies. 
These and later interventions were not only contributions to social thought, but also constituted critical commentaries on international events: dominant approaches towards sex, gender and sexuality served historically to naturalize social inequalities within imperialist and colonized nations and justify the persecution of those failing to fit physically with the binary divisions at their centre. In contrast to the malleable ‘one sex / one flesh’ model of the sexes dominant in earlier eras (Laqueur 1990), the eighteenth century onwards witnessed the aggressive promotion of ‘heteronormative orders’ that treated males and females as biological and cultural opposites, and presented the imposition of partial norms as natural imperatives. 
Examining the enforcement of these values, Michel Foucault (1978: 19) highlights how sex was subject to increasingly rigid surveillance involving the church; a surveillance that made it more visible and amenable to state control. Especially significant here was the use of population management as a technology of political power. With the emergence of modernity, governments strengthened the norms associated with sexual identity in order to identify, define and engineer ‘the birthrate, the age of marriage, legitimate and illegitimate births’ (Foucault, 1979: 25-6). Medical authorities also contributed to this process; equating sexuality during the C19th with ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ personalities in a process that validated the nuclear family (Foucault, 1978: 44). 
	These regulatory regimes persisted well into the twentieth century, yet they were contested. Building on Margaret Mead’s (1935) anthropological account of the cross-culturally varied organization of biological maleness/femaleness, feminist theory highlighted the importance of social practices for the classification of inter-corporeal relationships. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) emphasised the saliance of socialization for the bodily dispositions and social roles that sentenced women to be ‘the second sex’, vulnerable to objectification and domination. Her work was complemented later by a focus on the physical work required for heteronormativity to be received as an automatic outgrowth of biology. Newton (1972), for example, argued that sex role behavior was engineered to appear natural and reflective of a singular identity (rather than one of many individuals may choose to express depending on situationally specific factors). Young (1998) explored the naturalized phenomenal experience of such physical roles, while other feminists sought to explain how ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ became embodied through processes of institutionalisation (Rich 1980; McIntosh 1968; West and Zimmerman 1987).  
Seeking an overarching explanation for these circumstances, Judith Butler (1990: 151) viewed culture as operating through a ‘heterosexual matrix’ that ‘hails’ individuals to assume restricted subject positions and engage in specific types of performativity. It is not just cultural notions of gender that are supported and reproduced by such performances, according to her, but also the very idea there even exist such things as ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ bodies (Butler 1989; 1993). When repeated sufficiently, these performances manage the physical material they draw on in a manner that suggests there is something essential and unalterable about female and male bodies (Butler 1990: 22). 
	Feminist contributions employed different conceptions of the body in their analyses, especially in terms of the ontological weight attributed to the idea of the biologically sexed body (an issue associated with social constructionism to which we return in the next section). Nonetheless, the embodied subject is for these writers kept in view as a result of their broader commitment to engaging critically with how body matters are used to differentiate and maintain structural differences between groups of individuals. 

Social  / Constructionism
These strands of social theory proved important resources for the theoretically driven rise of body studies, providing a stabilizing set of issues and approaches based around the significance of embodied subjects. Yet body theorists were engaged in a difficult balancing act - exploring how society shaped embodiment without losing their grasp on the material facticity and causal significance of their subject - that was exemplified further by the rising dominance of perspectives informed by strong social constructionism. While all social theories of the body are to some extent constructionist - recognizing the significance of social relations and cultural processes for people’s bodily capabilities - strong variants attribute these with overwhelming ontological and epistemological significance. This is exemplified by the writings of Michel Foucault, the individual who exerted the single greatest influence on this approach.  
Foucault (1981: 152) described his writings as a ‘”history of bodies” and the manner in which what is most material and vital in them has been invested’.  Of particular significance to this history was the shift that occurred during the late early-modern period from ‘heavy’ means of discipline to the proliferation of bio-powers operating ‘through progressively finer channels’, gaining access to people’s ‘gestures’ and ‘daily actions’ (Foucault 1975; 1980: 58, 151-2; 2009: 1). Replacing the earlier focus on death with a commitment to the positive management of life, this heralded a new ‘art of government’ wherein disciplining the ‘soul’ became more important than punishing the flesh. Evident across hospitals, asylums, prisons and schools, its recent culmination is exemplified by a consumer culture that eschews ‘control by repression’ in favour of control by stimulation (Foucault 1981: 140).
Foucault’s writings proved enormously influential in steering body theory’s concerns with governmentality, medicine, gender, bio-citizenship, education and a host of other issues (e.g. Armstrong 1987; Sawicki 1991; Heyes 2007; Rose 2007a,b), but their strong constructionism is characterised by a tension. Taking the body seriously requires identifying what about it is consequential for society. Yet while Foucault has a great substantive concern with the subject, his ontological and epistemological view of the body as a discursive product leads him to view it as always already amenable to construction by other factors. This threatens to rob us of the capacity to recognize that different elements of embodiment (such as death or the morphology of the body) may be variably open to social forces at any point in time. As Dews (1987: 163) points out, failing to include in his writings an account that ‘makes the corporeal more than a tabula rasa’, makes it impossible to reckon the costs imposed by ‘an infinitesimal power’ over the body. In short, Foucault’s approach risks vanquishing the body - materially and phenomenologically - behind the impenetrable grids of meaning imposed by discourse (Turner, 1984: 245). 
The tension in Foucault’s approach has not prevented his substantive analyses being utilized to good effect by those concerned to highlight the significance of the embodied subject. Nevertheless, instead of addressing the tension created by Foucault’s strong constructionism, a plethora of analysts who appropriated the body for their own theoretical agendas exacerbated this problem by conceptualizing it as a product of those social processes and subjects with which they were concerned. Thus, theorists of discipline (Sawicki 1991; Turner 1991), consumer culture (Falk 1994), ageing (Featherstone and Hepworth 1991), and bio-politics and social policy (Hewitt 1991), for example, served to multiply the distinctive ways in which the body was viewed as constructed.  In so doing, they made even more elusive any sense that the body possessed a distinctive ontological grounding that was itself consequential for society.
Strong social constructionism did not eradicate other approaches to embodiment – including those explored in the previous section – but became enormously influential in directing body writings in the late twentieth century. Yet body theory has since moved on from its at times overwhelming commitment to specifically social variants of constructionism. In particular, alternative approaches associated with what has been referred to as the ‘new materialism’ have highlighted the embodied significance of affect, the assemblage of networks, and vitalism (Coole and Frost, 2010). While these refocus attention on the analytical weight that should be attributed to specific elements of embodied existence, however, they also exhibit centrifugal tendencies that return us to questions about the body subject’s meaning and causal significance. 
	
Affectual Bodies
Emerging from influential trends within cultural theory, the turn to affect redirected social thought’s concern with embodiment by focusing on what affectual intensities, currents and flows make bodies do (Massumi 2002; Connolly 2002, 2011; Anderson 2010; Clough 2010: 210).  This concern with our embodied capacities ‘to affect and be affected’ can be traced to Sedgwick’s and Franks’s (1995) engagement with emotions as ‘pre-subjective’ hardwired neurological reactions that prompt organismic responses (Leys 2010: 437), and Blackman (2012: x) has gone so far as to identify it as the ‘guiding principle’ now informing social theories of the body. 
Displacing the dominance Foucault attributes to discourse, affect theory traces the body’s social salience to its evolutionary heritage. The significance of social relationships, cultural norms and political campaigns do not from this perspective rest on the ideological effects of discourse, the persuasiveness of arguments, or on individual reflexivity: embodied consciousness arrives too late to influence body-subjects. Instead, they depend upon the power of elites to manipulate messages and threats that operate ‘autonomically, bypassing reason and criticality and seizing the body at the level of neural circuits, the nervous system, [and] the endocrine system’ (Blackman 2012: xi).  For Massumi (2010: 54), the result of these processes in the American political ‘war on terror’, for example, is such that the ‘felt reality of threat legitimates pre-emptive action’. Just as a fire alarm stirs in us anxiety and a readiness to escape the threat signified, so does the political transmission of warning move us to want preventative action (Massumi 2010: 64). This is a prime illustration of ‘how an abstract force can be materially determining’ (ibid.).
Contrasting instances of affect’s power to prompt incarnate actions exist in discussions of consumer culture. Featherstone (2010: 198) suggests that body images in advertising constitute a material ‘prosthetic for imaginative work’, stimulating in consumers affectually charged ‘invocations of becoming’. Relatedly, Thrift suggests that economies ‘scoop up affects’ and ‘amplify them in order to produce value’ by provoking consumer ‘fascination’ (Thrift 2010: 290).  Commercially profitable forms of allure and glamour are produced here through affectual intensities operating beneath critical consciousness to produce ‘captivation’ (Thrift 2010: 297). 
The turn to affect promotes an account of the body that invests neurologically stimulated basic emotions with an inherent dynamism productive of automatic behavior. Affects here are not personal feelings, but evolutionarily given pre-conscious responses relevant to the embodied constitution of humans (Leys 2011: 443). Corporeality remains important, but in terms of the capacity of authorities to manipulate ‘subliminal affective intensities’ that condition our thoughts and beliefs (Leys 2011: 436). While affect theory’s focus has undoubtedly tempered body theory’s emphasis on strong social constructionism, however, attributing such causal importance to this dimension of evolution renders embodied subjects captive to forces beyond their intentional control.  Yet the powerful remain an exception as a social group possessed of an unexplained ability to ‘stand back’ from affectual intensities in order to mould and direct them towards others; an explanatory gap that leaves affect theory vulnerable to accusations that it lacks a sufficiently sociological account of how emotional flows develop and circulate.
Despite its undoubted popularity, affect theory is not only problematic theoretically, but is also questionable empirically.  While those interested in circuits of affect insist reflection arrives too late to influence decision-making, this assumption relies on contentious experimental findings that focus on how brain stimuli can precede conscious intent in specific actions yet fail to take into account the existing intentionality of the embodied subject (Leys, 2011: 455). Isolating the brain from its embodied location and treating it as a director of action outside of those inter-corporeal contexts in which thought operates, the conclusions of affect theory also travel way beyond those many neuroscientists are prepared to make about their work (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). In short, decentering the embodied and environmentally emplaced subject in favour of affectual intensities replaces the embodied whole with a neurological part of limited analytical value.  Seeking to manage the balancing act between taking the body seriously and reaching beyond embodiment to its social and material embededdness, theories of affect raise the spectre of an evolutionary determinism associated previously with politically conservative variants of socio-biology. 

Networked Bodies 
Emerging during the 1980s from its parent field of science and technological studies, and gaining increasing influence in body theories from the turn of the century, actor network theory (ANT) addressed the overemphasis on social constructivism by attending to the materially assembled character of embodiment. Specifically, ANT approaches body-subjects as patterned networks of connections effected between objects and material technologies as well as ideas (Law and Hassard, 1999). To talk about ‘the body’ in isolation is, from this perspective, to miss the work and contingencies involved in making and ‘holding together’ the heterogeneous network of what it is to be embodied; a network open to change that can be ‘enacted’ in various ways (Mol and Law, 2004: 55; Latimer and Schillmeier, 2009). The body is here always multiple, always already connected to and mediated by networks of other objects, ideas, materials, people and technologies (Latour, 2002: 23; Mol, 2002: viii, 42-3).
ANT has facilitated increasing research into how the body is constituted by its implication within multiple material interdependencies.  Michael’s and Rosengarten’s (2012) collection on experimentation, politics, and emergent bodies, for example, argues that bodily capacities, frailties and diseases are not ‘givens’ but are enacted through the technological and other networks in which they emerge. It is Mol’s (2002) theorization of the diagnosis and treatment of atherosclerosis, however, that remains the key exemplar of this approach. How we come to know about disease and illness in medical contexts reveals there are different ways of ‘choreographing’ ontological matter, and that our bodies, identities and diseases are ‘more than one’ (Cussins, 1996; Moll, 2002: viii. 42-3).  
In terms of its capacity to illuminate the causal significance of embodiment, ANT has avoided discursive or affectual reductionism, drawing our attention to the network of interconnections, possessed of their own ‘modes of existence’, that constitute the body (Latour, 2011: 312). Its determination not to overemphasise the significance of social relationships, outside of their emplacement alongside all manner of material interdependencies, firmly contextualizes embodied subjects within their environments. There remain questions, however, about ANTs capacity to provide the embodied subject with either an ontological identity or causal weight sufficient to provide it with enduring theoretical significance. 
ANT treats each aspect of a network as an actor or actant, highlighting the forms of agency materials as well as people can be said to exercise, but does little to differentiate the ontological qualities of these phenomena. Yet objects do not possess the conscious intentions, habits, internal conversations, desires or instincts of humans, phenomena key to sociological conceptions of agency (Archer 2000). This failure of ANT to take seriously the specific properties of embodied subjects is also evident in its tendency to collapse issues of ontological and epistemology. Michael and Rosengarten (2013: 3) assert that ‘what the body ‘is’ and how it emerges depends on the relations of which it is a part and through which it is enacted’, but bodies possess properties that themselves shape and have to be included in or taken account by social relations and institutions. Bodies change over time, and there are many epistemological ways of viewing the body, but while the body opens up onto its surroundings in all manner of ways, the embodied subject still confronts the issue that it is their one body that is frail, gets sick and, eventually dies. Without this recognition, there remains the suspicion that ANT fails to attribute the body with sufficient significance for it to warrant a central place in social theory. 

Vitalistic Bodies
Vitalistic theories developed from the eighteenth and nineteenth century quest within science and philosophy for the elan vital, yet have exerted a growing influence on recent body writings. Despite their diversity, vitalistic approaches unite in standing against models of organic closure and equilibrium. For Deleuze (1969), living systems are always reaching beyond themselves: they incarnate pure predicates or potentials that, if carried to their limit, would destroy bounded organisms. The body from this perspective is always becoming something other than it, possessing a virtual existence, a body without organs (BwO) (Deleuze and Guattari 1972; 1980). 
The BwO is not literally deprived of organs, but is removed analytically from any sense that its actions and reactions are formed by patriarchy, the state, social class or other societal forces in a manner that imposes regularities on or closure to its capacities or development. Instead, the body is ‘a formation of a relation among potentials’, involving a contingent ‘territorialisation or linking up of organs’, with the eye, brain, ear, hand etc., and transformed through these connections as it responds to life’s vitalism within and outside its permeable borders (Colebrook 2010). Grosz (1994: 161-2), for example, uses these vitalistic themes to reconceive embodied ontology away from reified conceptions of male and female, towards a concern with ‘flows’, ‘planes’. ‘intensities’ and ‘becomings.’ Underpinning these characteristics is a corporeal desire, conceived of as inherent within life, opposed to social constraints (Deleuze and Guattari 1972). This enables Grosz (1994: 181) to depict female bodies as excessive in relation to patriarchal control - ‘sites of multiple struggles’ from which emerge ‘unexpected and unpredictable events’ - and has allowed those using the vitalistic themes of her work to explore previously fixed notions of difference as phenomena produced through and contingent on the context in which they emerge (Colls 2012)
In its concern with the dynamism of life beyond the membrane of the organism, vitalism also moves away from the human, throwing into doubt any concern with a social theory that places the embodied subject at its centre. Instead, there is more concern with the deterritorialisation of the organism through imaginings and creations that facilitate extensions of action and movement beyond the present, and beyond embodied life. This deterritorialising vitalism capitalises on the insight that the body’s experience of self must pass through some form of exterior ‘whether that is the language through which I hear myself speak’ or an image and expression mediated through new technology and digital media (Hayles 2005; Hansen 2006; Munster 2006; Wegenstein 2006; Colebrook 2010). 
In discussing the approach to embodiment adopted by such vitalistic writings, Colebrook (2010) emphasises that those who focus on the dynamism of life beyond the organism are identifying real conditions associated with what it is to be embodied. As she argues, the living body cannot be self-enclosed but must be open to the needs of life if it is to survive. The logic of evolutionary adaptation, indeed, is such bodies must constantly be ready to become more than they are if they are to survive and prosper. Yet Colebrook also acknowledges that if the living being is too open, failing to attend to the dynamic equilibrium that characterizes its present existence, it is unable to develop, to possess a discernible identity, or even to survive.
In prioritizing the ongoing process of organic change and transformation over a focus on the fixities that can result from socially constructionist approaches, vitalistic approaches continue to confront a problem stemming from the balancing act all body theories must grapple with. As Colebrook (2010) herself suggests, the problem here is that vitalistic theory runs the risk of failing to recognize meaningful continuities within changing forms of embodiment. Turner’s (2006) analysis of human rights demonstrates some of the problems with this: regarding the body as fated to constantly become something other than it is makes it difficult to explore inequalities and oppression in relation to embodied subjects in the here and now. 

Recentering the Embodied Subject
Having outlined the context from which emerged social theory’s interest in the body, I have explored the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in these writings. If contemporary theories have at times decentred and deterritorialised the incarnate subject, body matters nevertheless remain high profile within the current global era. In governance, for example, the events of 9/11 and the Bush government’s subsequent declaration of a ‘War on Terror’ led to a marked expansion in the extent to which the body has been treated as a password (Davis 2007). The rendition practices to which bodily subjects identified through drone cameras, CCTV, passport control, retinal scanning and other means as ‘dangerous’ were sometimes subjected, moreover, illustrate the continuing relevance of ‘heavy’ and ‘ponderous’ methods of physical discipline and control. 
	The body has also been positioned centre stage as a result of the molecular reification of racial categories that has occurred since the first draft of the Human Genome Project was completed at the start of the C21st. As Troy Duster (2015) explains, while pharmaceutical, criminological and other industries and governmental agencies involved in exploiting the findings of ‘the new genetics’ have utilized the varied languages of personalised medicine, law, and individual ancestral genealogy to describe their activities, there has in practice been a wholesale re-inscription of race on to the bodies of millions across the globe. This is despite the fact that DNA testing is an imperfect and partial means of tracing ancestral lineages, and is further undermined by a reliance on simplistic notions of ‘race’ and the assumption that substantial populations once existed in states of complete ‘racial purity’ unaffected by ancient migrations (Duster, 2015: 10-11). In the face of recent debates regarding the malleability of embodied identities, this research also locates race in identifiers that supposedly determine the emergent identities of individuals and rules out any possibility that people may enjoy a degree of choice over the groups to which they belong (Brubaker, 2016). The practical implications of this renewed racialization of the body, moreover, echo past forms of discrimination given their implication in such areas as crime profiling, clinical trials and research projects that presuppose genetic variations while ignoring cultural differences and social inequalities, (Duster, 2015: 10-16). 
Elsewhere, embodied subjects have been subjected to intensified commodification processes. David Harvey (2004) has suggested that we are living through a period of primitive accumulation, evidenced not only by the numbers of people still subjected to slavery, but also by the growth of ‘transplant trafficking’ in which value is extracted through ‘a global billion-dollar criminal industry involved in the transfer of fresh kidneys (and half-livers) from living and dead providers to the seriously… ill and affluent or medically insured mobile transplant patients’ (Scheper-Hughes 2011:58). Extracting bodily processes for value, the biotechnological exploitation of DNA has been associated with potential medical advances that on Friday 6 by 5.00pmhave attracted billions of dollars of capital investment in an attempt to sell ‘surplus health’ to the ‘worried well’ and those seeking to ‘live life to the full.’  Involving actions undertaken voluntarily or involuntary, involving the individual as a whole or in part, bodies have never been so multiply entangled in circuits of financial value.  
If body matters continue to drag social theory back to the incarnate, analyses still confront the dilemma of needing to travel beyond the confines of the body while ensuring they do not allow the organic dimensions of embodied to fade from view.  In this context, and in conclusion to this chapter, I want to offer a minimal but essential counterweight to help avoid this disappearance by revisiting the notion of the body schema.  This concept does not make detailed prescriptions about the precise form body theory should take. Nevertheless, while insisting alongside much theory on the importance of social processes and material surroundings for bodily actions, identities and structures, it also imparts to the intentionally oriented embodied subject sufficient ontological weight for it to remain in view. 
Research into the body schema was associated initially with developments in neurophysiology at the beginning of the twentieth century (Head 1920; Schilder 1978 [1935]) and there have been debates about its theoretical utility. Nevertheless, those neurosociologists and neuroscientists sensitive to the social processes that shape the embodied workings of the brain have usefully restated the necessity for survival of the human capacity to sensorily and pre-consciously map and coordinate the body’s location within its wider environment (e.g. Damasio, 2010; Pitts-Taylor, 2012). In this context, the body schema can be defined as the embodied template that enables subjects to unify their ‘postural, tactile, kinaesthetic, and visual sensations so that these are experienced as the sensations of a subject coordinated into a single space’ despite the individual not possessing an exhaustive view of themselves or their surroundings (Grosz, 1994: 83). Crucial to the lived experience we have of our bodily selves, and our capacity to coordinate our actions, construct a coherent sense of identity, and engage in as well as reflect on social action, the body schema emerges gradually from its initially fragmented state in infancy shaped as it is by social relations and physical surroundings, but also by the irreducible facticity of the body itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 113,117). 
The significance of social relations to the stimulus of the body schema is apparent in the elementary structures of role taking (and the affects and expressions involved in this interaction) engaged in between early caregivers and pre-linguistic infants (Schilder 1978 [1935]; Joas 1983, 1997). This learning to coordinate and present the body in order to stimulate desired responses continues into adulthood as we become accustomed to projecting ourselves forward, and being evaluated, on the basis of bodily norms and cultural 'rules' (McDowell 2009). The body schema develops not only through social stimuli, however, but also as a consequence of the feelings, perceptions and movements fostered by our organic being as we 'bump into' and problem solve in the physical world (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Archer 2000). By engaging with the material environment, individuals learn how to utilise objects that enable them to expand the means with which they project themselves onto the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 234). As Dewey (1980 [1934]: 13) notes, no creature lives within the confines of its skin and our limbs and senses are a 'realms of connection' with 'what lies beyond [our] bodily frame’. With experience, individuals also come to realise how the physical environment changes them, facilitating practical techniques and certain habits, and provoking muscular growth, aches and pains as the body adjusts to the challenges in its surroundings. 
These processes constitutive of the body schema suggest that the biological body is responsive to the social, cultural and material environment. From our built surroundings, to the latest advances in digital media, to the relationships characterized by various ratios of domination and subordination, to cultural meanings and symbols that assess physical appearance, people’s sense of what their bodies are and can do is irreducible to the topography of the body itself (Sobchack 2010). While the body schema may be stretched by social norms, values, and technologies, however, it remains 'in conversation' with the bones, flesh, blood and senses that facilitated its development, and an enfleshed subject that must negotiate the environment on which it depends. Body schemas thus develop on the basis of a practical inter subjectivity (Joas, 1997), the interactional effects of bodily selves on each other as they are engaged in the manipulation of physical things (Mead 1932: 169).  As Mead (1903; 1962: 134) and Dewey (1896; 1980 [1934]: 13) note, our biological needs equip us with a ‘pre-reflective intentionality of the human body’, directed initially towards survival, which means that we do not just react to stimuli or internalise permanently and without critical reflection cultural norms, but engage with them on the basis of our own desires, aims and conscious thoughts. 
In this context, it is possible for body schemas to be expansive in enabling individuals to reach beyond and extend the horizons of their physical being, recruiting the environment to their plans in a manner that enhances their capacity for exercising agency. Alternatively, when individuals are placed in subordinate positions, subject to oppression or pain, the schema can shrink back to the limits of the physical subject’s immediate needs (Scarry, 1985).  The capacity of body schemas to expand or contract depending upon whether the social and material environments in which they develop can, indeed, be seen as a metric of the degree of complementarity that exists between social and individual development.  
This recognition of the body schema’s importance does not attempt to prescribe in detail how theories of embodiment should develop in the future, but does provide one way of ensuring that whatever emphasis may be placed on change, mobility, transformation, connectedness or other theoretical priorities, the incarnate nature of embodied subjects is held in view. There are many reasons why this recognition is important for social theory in general, but the significance of embodiment to the very existence of humans and to the relationships they forge within and with their wider environments should perhaps be sufficient for us to acknowledge the need for such a move.  
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